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1 Introduction
Models of reference-dependent preferences are regarded as a major advance in behavioral
economics, rationalizing a range of observations at odds with the canonical model of ex-
pected utility over final wealth (Kahneman et al., 1990; Camerer et al., 1997; Odean, 1998;
Rabin, 2000). Critical to such applications is the formulation of the reference point around
which gains and losses are encoded. A recent literature has examined characterizations of
the reference point based on rational expectations of potential outcomes (Kőszegi and Ra-
bin, 2006, 2007) (henceforth KR).1 These expectations-based models have the promise to
be readily and broadly applicable, closing the model with a foundation to which economic
tools are already adapted.
Despite the promise of the KR formulation of the reference point, tests of the theory have
yielded mixed results (see, e.g., Ericson and Fuster, 2011; Heffetz and List, 2014; Goette
et al., 2016; Abeler et al., 2011; Gneezy et al., Forthcoming). While early experimental
applications in exchange behavior and effort decisions showed treatment effects in line with
KR comparative statics, subsequent replications and extensions have shown more limited
or null effects.
Our study begins with an observation: within the KR model, heterogeneity in the key
behavioral parameter, loss aversion, can confound inference. Given the documented vari-
ation in individual measures of loss aversion (see, e.g. Sprenger, 2015; Erev et al., 2008;
Harinck et al., 2007; Nicolau, 2012; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009), this is potentially an issue
of first order importance. Failure to account for heterogeneity in loss aversion may well be
responsible for some of the conflict noted in the above studies. For example, the baseline
experiments of Ericson and Fuster (2011) identify a general unwillingness to exchange a
randomly endowed item. This unwillingness is reduced by increasing the probability of
being permitted to exchange, consistent with the KR predictions. Using a very similar
1Our analysis will focus on the formulations of KR. An earlier literature also provided formulations of
reference dependence grounded in rational expectations, but without the equilibrium concepts we analyze
(Bell, 1985; Loomes and Sugden, 1986).
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design, the initial experiment of Heffetz and List (2014) find a general willingness to ex-
change that is not influenced by permission probability. Section 2 of this paper clarifies
that such results could obtain from differences in the distribution of loss aversion across
experiments.2 Even with a majority of subjects being loss averse, heterogeneity deeply
influences the power of any experimental test. Our specific findings on the distribution of
loss aversion indicate required sample sizes of around 600 subjects for identifying aggregate
KR treatment effects, considerably larger than several of the above-noted experiments.
We design an exchange experiment with the objective of examining the force of expectations-
based models while recognizing heterogeneity in loss aversion. Our central treatment plau-
sibly alters expectations of exchange for a given object, and we experimentally control
the prior experiences of agents. The manipulation of experience allows us to collect, and
validate, a measure of loss aversion for an alternate object, providing an assessment of het-
erogeneity. Our objective is achieved through between-subjects variation and a purposeful
parsimony of choices, with a single binary decision per subject.
We implement our study in a sample of 607 subjects. In a first stage, subjects are ran-
domly endowed with one of two objects. Though no choices are made, subjects are asked to
provide ratings of both objects, and their initial mood is measured using standard psycho-
logical scales. Subsequently, based on a randomization device, the endowed object is taken
away for half of the subjects and replaced with the alternative object, after which mood
is measured again. The initial ratings allow us to form a taxonomy of types, constructed
from a simple structural model of rating statements.3 The randomized confiscation and
2Naturally, many other ex-post explanations exist. For example, differences in consumption utilities
across experiments could outweigh the forces of loss aversion, or apparently small design difference could
be amplified in the eyes of subjects.
3We also provide reduced form evidence based only on the ratings themselves. The structural model
assumes ratings are driven by consumption utilities and loss aversion. Though no choices are made,
the core assumption is that subjects rate the object truthfully. The measure of loss aversion estimated
is consistent with rational expectations as subjects were not told in advance that their their endowed
object may be taken away when the ratings data was collected. An alternative design would attempt to
precisely measure loss aversion either through statements of small stakes risk aversion (Fehr and Goette,
2007; Sprenger, 2015) or some other choice. Such tests would require both additional assumptions (e.g.,
about the correlation between consumption utility and loss aversion) and additional experimental choices.
Recognizing both the polluting potential of such choices and the challenge of modeling the full body of
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corresponding changes in mood measures provide for an initial validation of our taxonomy,
ensuring that people who are classified as loss averse actually do experience sensations of
loss in their measured mood.
In a second stage, subjects are again endowed with one of two objects. The second stage
objects have no plausible complementarities with either object in the first stage, eliminating
the desire to construct bundles of objects across the two stages. In this second stage,
subjects make their only choice in the experiment. Forty percent of subjects are asked a
baseline endowment effect question of whether they would like to trade their object for the
alternative. The other sixty percent of subjects are asked whether they would like to trade
their object under a probabilistic forced exchange mechanism akin to Goette et al. (2016).
With probability 0.5, regardless of their decision, exchange will be forced. Under the KR
model, individuals who are loss averse should grow more willing to exchange relative to
baseline when probabilistically forced to do so, while those who are loss loving should grow
less willing to exchange (statements which we formalize in section 2).
The second stage provides for two central analyses. First, in the baseline condition we
further validate our taxonomy of loss averse types by examining whether individuals coded
as loss averse in Stage 1 are also unwilling to exchange for a completely different object in
Stage 2. Second, we study expectations-based forces by examining sensitivity of behavior
to probabilistic forced exchange. Given these predictions depend upon the heterogeneity
in loss aversion, this exercise is conducted separately for the different types identified in
Stage 1.
We document three key findings. First, on average subjects do appear to prefer their
randomly endowed object in Stage 1, indicating an endowment effect in ratings.4 Corre-
spondingly, we estimate loss aversion on aggregate. At the individual level 36% of subjects
are classified as loss averse, 40% as potentially loss neutral, and 25% as loss loving. Our
experimental behavior through the lens of the KR model (for discussion, see Sprenger, 2015), we opted
for this more broad categorization. Failure to correctly categorize types should lead to a lack of predictive
validity in Stage 2 of the experiment, working against our identified results.
4Forty-seven percent of subjects report a higher rating for their endowed object, twenty-two percent
report the same rating, and thirty-one percent report a higher rating for the alternative object.
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relative proportion of loss averse and loss loving is comparable to other recent findings on
the heterogeneity of loss aversion (Chapman et al., 2017).5
Second, the taxonomy of loss aversion is respected in the responsiveness of mood to ran-
domized experience. Loss averse types have significantly larger decreases in mood than
loss loving types if their Stage 1 object is confiscated. More compellingly, this taxonomy
is respected in Stage 2 behavior. In the Stage 2 baseline condition, loss averse types are
less willing to trade than others, delivering a substantial endowment effect for a different,
randomly-assigned object.
Third, the comparative statics of expectations-based models are decisively supported in
Stage 2. Following KR predictions, loss-averse types grow significantly more willing to
trade under probabilistic forced exchange, while loss-loving types grow significantly less-so.
Recognizing and accounting for the heterogeneity in types is critical as the aggregate data
reproduce the null findings of Goette et al. (2016) for a similar forced exchange mechanism.
We believe our results add to the discussion of reference-dependent preferences and ex-
change anomalies in general. First, recognizing and accounting for heterogeneity in loss
aversion allows for more nuanced tests of expectations-based reference dependence. Given
different findings across prior studies (Ericson and Fuster, 2011; Heffetz and List, 2014),
the null aggregate effects here and in Goette et al. (2016), and our theoretical develop-
ment demonstrating that KR comparative statics change sign for different types of loss
aversion, heterogeneity appears to be a confound of first order importance. We show, in
a simple setting, that the forces of expectations-based models are reliably recovered once
heterogeneity in loss aversion is accounted for.
Second, a body of research has questioned the generality of exchange anomalies such as the
endowment effect. One line in particular has argued that trading experience can increase
5Based on willingness to pay and willingness to accept data for lotteries from a representative sample,
Chapman et al. (2017) find an endowment effect for 60% of the respondents, no endowment effect for 10%
of the subjects, and a reverse endowment effect for approximately 30% of the sample. Loss averse types
in our data are 1.44 times more likely than loss loving types. In their data loss averse types are twice as
frequent.
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the willingness to engage in exchange (List, 2003, 2004), with the implication that the en-
dowment effect should be ‘selected’ out in markets. Indeed, Engelmann and Hollard (2010),
show that even a very minute body of experience can eliminate the endowment effect. In
section 4.3, we link the experiences of Stage 1, and the subjective perception thereof, to
exchange behavior in Stage 2. Even accounting for heterogeneity in types, there remains
a marked distaste for exchange in Stage 2. This ‘residual’ endowment effect is related
to experience in Stage 1. Interestingly, the effects of experience are not reflected in the
objective outcome of keeping or losing one’s object, but rather in the subjective perception
of this experience.6 Individuals with a negative perception of their Stage 1 experience are
less willing to exchange in Stage 2. Such an observation may help to explain the findings
of Engelmann and Hollard (2010). In their study, experience is induced through trading
rounds, in which subjects must make an exchange in order to keep any object. Making
such an explicit connection between exchange and positive experience should indeed lead
to more willingness to trade. This also suggests a path by which exchange anomalies may
persist: negative experiences (both for exchanging and not exchanging) can lead to less
willingness to exchange subsequently. As such, the endowment effect need not be selected
quickly out of the market through trading experience alone if perceptions thereof are not
uniformly positive.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we set the theoretical background and de-
rive behavioral predictions. Section 3 and 4 present the experimental design and results,
respectively. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Considerations and Design Guidance
We examine the forces of expectations-based reference-dependent preferences in simple
exchange settings with two goods, recognizing heterogeneity of loss aversion. The theo-
6Subjectively, the experience could be positive or negative depending on the subject’s loss aversion.
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retical development hues closely to our experimental design, providing motivation for our
analyses.
Consider a two-dimensional utility function over the two objects of interest, good X and
good Y. Let c = (mX ,mY ) and r = (rX , rY ) represent vectors of consumption util-
ity and reference utility, respectively. The KR model specifies a utility function with
two components, consumption utility, m(c) ≡ mX + mY , and gain-loss utility, n(c|r) ≡
nX(mX |rX) + nY (mY |rY ) ≡ µ(mX − rX) +µ(mY − rY ), with separability across consump-
tion dimensions. Let mX ∈ {0, X} and mY ∈ {0, Y } stand for both the outcome and the
corresponding consumption utility of owning no or one unit of good X, and no or one unit
of good Y, respectively. Overall utility is described by
u(c|r) = u(mX ,mY |rX , rY ) = mX + nX(mX |rX) +mY + nY (mY |rY )
= mX + µ(mX − rX) +mY + µ(mY − rY ),
where
µ(z) =
 ηz if z ≥ 0ηλz if z < 0.
In this piece-wise linear gain-loss function, the parameter η captures the magnitude of
changes relative to the reference point, and λ is the degree of loss aversion.
2.1 Determination of the Reference Point
For the KR model, the vector r is determined as part of a consistent forward-looking
plan for behavior. The KR model posits a reference-dependent expected utility function
U(F |G), taking as input a distribution F over consumption outcomes, c, which are valued
relative to a distribution G of reference points, r. That is
U(F |G) =
∫ ∫
u(c|r)dF (c)dG(r).
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A Personal Equilibrium is a situation where, given that the decision-maker expects as a
reference some distribution F , she indeed prefers F as a consumption distribution over
all alternative consumption distributions, F ′. Ex-ante optimal behavior has to accord
with expectations of that behavior. Formally, given a choice set, D, of lotteries, F , over
consumption outcomes c = (mX ,mY ), Personal Equilibrium states the following:
Personal Equilibrium (PE): A choice F ∈ D, is a personal equilibrium if
U(F |F ) ≥ U(F ′|F ) ∀ F ′ ∈ D.
Regardless of endowment, if good X is to be chosen in a PE, then r = (X, 0) and if good
Y is to be chosen in a PE then r = (0, Y ).
2.1.1 Manipulating r: Probabilistic Forced Exchange
As noted above, the PE concept requires a consistency between c and r. In a simple
exchange experiment over two objects, potential PE selections are [c, r] = [(X, 0), (X, 0)]
and [c, r] = [(0, Y ), (0, Y )]. Depending on the endowment of X or Y, only one of these
choices represents an unwillingness to trade. Assuming an endowment of X, the individual
can support not exchanging [c, r] = [(X, 0), (X, 0)] in a PE if
U(X, 0|X, 0) > U(0, Y |X, 0),
or
X >
1 + η
1 + ηλ
Y. (1)
Note that the smallest value of X at which the individual can support not exchanging,
X = 1+η
1+ηλ
Y , is inferior to Y if λ > 1. As such, loss averse individuals can support not
exchanging X for Y even if Y would be preferred on the basis of consumption utility alone.
This describes the mechanism by which the KR model generates an endowment effect.
Figure 1 graphs X against λ for Y = 1, η = 1, showing that as λ increases, the lowest
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value of X at which the agent can support not exchanging decreases following a simple
inverse relationship.
Also graphed in Figure 1 is the alternate PE cutoff value corresponding to an agent who
fulfills an expectation to exchange their endowed object X for Y.
U(0, Y |0, Y ) > U(X, 0|0, Y ),
or
X <
1 + ηλ
1 + η
Y.
The highest value of X at which the agent can support exchanging, X = 1+ηλ
1+η
Y , increases
linearly with λ. Note that for X < X < X, there will be multiple equilibria, with
the agent able to support both exchanging and not exchanging as a PE. The KR model
is constructed with a notion of equilibrium refinement, Preferred Personal Equilibrium
(PPE), in which ex-ante utility is used as a basis for selection and, hence, for making
more narrow predictions. We provide our results without appeal to equilibrium selection,
assuming only that actions are more likely to be taken if they are PE than if they are not.7
Now, consider a setting of probabilistic forced exchange. With probability 0.5 the agent,
assumed endowed with X, will be forced to exchange X for Y regardless of their choice. If
the individual wishes to retain her object, she is subject to a stochastic reference point, as
with probability 0.5 it will be confiscated. She can support attempting not to exchange if
U(0.5(X, 0) + 0.5(0, Y )|0.5(X, 0) + 0.5(0, Y )) > U(0, Y |0.5(X, 0) + 0.5(0, Y )),
or
X > Y. (2)
7Goette et al. (2016) discuss PPE considerations with probabilistic forced exchange, ensuring that the
core comparative statics associated with probabilistic forced exchange are maintained under equilibrium
refinement.
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Figure 1: Loss Aversion and Personal Equilibrium Values
Notes: PE cutoff values for agent endowed with X, Y = 1 and η = 1. For X > X = 1+η1+ηλY , agents can
support not exchanging as a PE in standard exchange environment. For X < X = 1+ηλ1+η Y , agents can
support exchanging as a PE in a standard exchange environment. With forced exchange probability of
0.5 X(0.5) = Y and X(0.5) = X = 1+ηλ1+η Y . Endowed with X, loss averse agents with λ > 1 (as in point
A) can support not exchanging in PE in standard exchange environment, but cannot with probabilistic
forced exchange. Loss loving agents with λ < 1 (as in point B) cannot support not exchanging in PE in
standard exchange environment, but can with probabilistic forced exchange.
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The individual can support attempting to retain X only on the basis of consumption
utility values, regardless of the level of loss aversion. The manipulation of probabilistic
forced exchange changes the PE cutoff for X from X = 1+η
1+ηλ
Y to X(0.5) = Y . Figure
1 illustrates the changing PE cutoff values associated with not exchanging. Loss averse
agents can no longer support not exchanging in PE at values of X lower than Y.
Though probabilistic forced exchange alters the PE considerations associated with not
exchanging, it leaves unchanged the PE considerations associated with exchanging. The
agent can support exchanging in PE if
U(0, Y |0, Y ) > U(0.5(X, 0) + 0.5(0, Y )|0, Y ),
which as before is
X <
1 + ηλ
1 + η
Y.
X(0.5) = X is noted in Figure 1.
Manipulating forced-exchange probability carries clear value for testing the KR model.
Under the standard assumption of loss aversion, λ > 1, agents can support not exchanging
in PE for values of X < Y in a standard exchange experiment, but cannot do so with
forced exchange probability of 0.5. The intuition is simple: attempting to retain the object
exposes the agent to potential losses under forced exchange. She cannot support accepting
these losses. Under the assumption that actions are more likely to be taken if they are PE
than if they are not, agents’ willingness to exchange should increase with forced exchange.
This is a unique prediction of expectations-based models not shared by prior formulations
of the reference point. Goette et al. (2016) demonstrate this potential manipulation and
its value for testing the KR model based only upon PE considerations. Importantly, this
comparative static prediction hinges on agents being loss averse. In the next subsection, we
investigate heterogeneity in loss aversion, showing that the comparative static associated
with probabilistic forced exchange can reverse sign if individuals have λ < 1.
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2.2 Heterogeneity in Loss Aversion
A number of recent studies have questioned the universality of loss aversion (see, e.g.,
Sprenger (2015); Erev et al. (2008); Harinck et al. (2007); Nicolau (2012)).8 Heterogeneity
in loss aversion can confound the identification of expectations-based models. Under KR
preferences, different values of λ can lead to different directional predictions for the effects
of forced exchange. Figure 1 illustrates the logic, graphing the PE cutoff values for not
exchanging, X = 1+η
1+ηλ
Y and X(0.5) = Y , and for exchanging, X = X(0.5) = 1+ηλ
1+η
Y .
Consider the case of a point like A, with λ > 1 and a valuation X slightly below Y = 1. In
the standard exchange experiment this individual can support not exchanging even though
X < Y as X > X. With forced exchange probability 0.5, this individual can no longer
support not exchanging as X < X(0.5). Assuming that actions are more likely to be taken
when they are PE than when they are not leads to the Goette et al. (2016) comparative
static prediction: individuals should grow more willing to exchange with probabilistic
forced exchanged.
Now, consider a point like B with λ < 1 and a value of X slightly above Y = 1. Such an
individual cannot support not exchanging as a PE in the standard exchange experiment
even though X > Y as X < X.9 With forced exchange probability of 0.5 this individual
can now support not exchanging as a PE as X > X(0.5). Again, assuming that actions
are more likely to be taken when they are PE than when they are not leads to the opposite
prediction from the prior case. An agent with λ < 1 grows less willing to exchange with
probabilistic forced exchange, reversing the sign of the previously described comparative
static.10
8Though λ > 1 obtains for the majority of subjects, a substantial fraction are found to be close to loss
neutral, λ = 1, and loss loving, λ < 1.For example, in the individual estimates of Sprenger (2015), 27% of
the sample has λ < 1 within the 95% confidence interval of their estimated λ, while the remaining 73%
are significantly loss averse.
9This individual can also not support exchanging as a PE given his loss-lovingness as X > X. That is,
no PE selections exist for this individual. KR note the possibility of multiplicity and absence of equilibria
in their theoretical development.
10Note that the example provided relied on both differences in loss aversion, λ, and consumption utility,
X, between points A and B. This is only for illustrative purposes. If two agents instead had the same
value of X, either above or below Y , with one being loss averse and the other loss loving, then one of them
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Taken together the analysis of probabilistic forced exchange and heterogeneity give insights
for our experimental design. Our study adapts Goette et al.’s (2016) central manipulation
of probabilistic forced exchange to a binary exchange situation with two objects, and also
manipulates prior experiences to deliver and validate measures of loss aversion.11
3 Experimental design and procedures
Our design is comprised of two stages. In Stage 1, a taxonomy of loss averse types is
created, exchange experience is manipulated via random confiscation, and the effects of this
experience on mood are measured. In Stage 2, subjects are assigned to either a standard
exchange study or one with probabilistic forced exchange, making their only choice in the
experiment. Stage 1 experiences and measures of loss aversion can then be connected to
Stage 2 behavior. Figure 2 illustrates the experimental order of events.
3.1 Stage 1: Measures of Loss Aversion and Manipulation of Ex-
perience
Procedures. The experimenter welcomed the participants in a small presentation room
and informed them that the study would consist of two stages. At each seat there was a card
with a number (placed face down). Then, without further explanation, the experimenter
projected on the wall two equally-sized pictures of the respective Stage 1 objects for that
session along with the description and two short bullet points on the characteristics of the
product. The exact information presented to subjects is reproduced in Appendix C.
would be affected by probabilistic forced exchange (either positively or negatively) and the other would
not. This implies that if X is symmetrically distributed around Y , and X and λ are independent, the sign
of comparative statics can differ depending on whether λ > 1 or λ < 1. Loss averse agents will grow more
willing to exchange on average while loss loving agents will grow less willing to exchange on average as
exchange is probabilistically forced.
11Unlike Goette et al. (2016), we also study a direct exchange mechanism that does not require eliciting
the willingness to pay or willingness to accept in monetary terms using price lists.
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Figure 2: Timeline of Laboratory Experiment
Notes: The figure displays the course of events in both treatment conditions, baseline (p = 0.0) and forced
exchange (p = 0.5).
After allowing sufficient time (three minutes) to study the projected information, the ex-
perimenter asked subjects to turn the card in front of them over and move to the cubicle
with the corresponding number in the adjacent computer laboratory. In their private cu-
bicle, which was separated and not visible from the outside, subjects would find one of the
two presented goods. Computer instructions then informed the subject that she possesses
the object in front of her, and that she is free to inspect it more closely.
After three minutes allotted for inspection of the good, we asked subjects how much they
liked and wanted each one of the goods. Specifically, for each object we asked “How much
do you like this product?” and “How much would you want to have this product?” with
response scales ranging from 0=“Not at all” to 8=“Very much”. These ratings data are used
to construct our measures of loss aversion, notably collected without experimental choice.
These ratings are collected before any further instructions are given, including instructions
related to confiscation.
Next, the computer instructions announced that the experimenter would randomly draw
a number between 1 and 20 using a rotating lottery drum placed on a table in the middle
of the room. Half of the subjects learned that they would lose their current good and
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receive the other one in return in case a number between 1 and 10 is drawn. Instructions
for the other half read that this exchange would only take place if a number between 11
and 20 is drawn.12 The experimenter drew the number in a way that both the lotto device
containing the 20 balls and the drawn number was visible from every cabin. The exchange
was executed after the draw by the experimenter, who, without further comment, replaced
the object for subjects who had lost their good due to the drawn number. Subsequent
instructions informed subjects that they would keep their current object and asked them
to return to the lecture room for the second stage.
Immediately before and immediately after the random confiscation was conducted, we
elicited subjects’ mood using standard psychological scales (Bradley and Lang, 1994). Sub-
jects answered the question “Please answer the following questions about how you currently
feel. Which expressions better apply to you at the moment?” by positioning a slider on
an 11-point response scale. The lower end (0) was labeled using the words “Unhappy,
Angry, Unsatisfied, Sad, Desperate” and the upper end (10) was labeled “Happy, Thrilled,
Satisfied, Content, Hopeful”. The individual change in these scores are used to provide an
initial validation of our taxonomy of types.
3.2 Stage 2: Probabilistic Forced Exchange, Heterogeneity and
Prior Experience
Procedures. The basic procedures in the second stage were deliberately kept exactly
identical to those in the first stage. Upon their return to the lecture room, the experimenter
projected another page onto the wall, this time presenting the objects of the Stage 2
goods bundle of that session. In the meantime, a second experimenter allocated objects
to the cubicles in the computer laboratory next door in a pre-specified order. Subjects
were ushered back to their cubicle where again they found their second object, learned
12This loss condition was counterbalanced within each subsample endowed with the same good, such
that irrespective of the draw, exchange would take place for exactly half of the subjects initially endowed
with either good.
15
that it belonged to them and were allowed sufficient time for inspection. We studied two
conditions.
Baseline treatment. In the baseline condition, subjects received an opportunity to
voluntarily exchange their endowed good for the other one. Whichever way they chose,
they would keep or receive their desired object and there would be no further exchange.
The baseline condition is a standard exchange setting.
Forced exchange treatment. The second condition implemented an exchange study
with probabilistic forced exchange. The instructions specified that irrespective of their
choice of exchanging their endowed object, exchange would take place anyway with a
probability of 50% based on a draw from the lotto drum as in the first stage. This means
that for a subject who decided to trade voluntarily, the forced exchange did not bear any
consequences. However, for a subject who chose to keep her object, there was an additional
chance of losing it.
Several noted issues with experimental investigations of market exchange motivated our
purposefully simple design (Plott and Zeiler, 2005, 2007). First, subjects take a simple
binary choice, alleviating potential concerns related to the use of ‘multiple price lists’ in
exchange experiments. Specifically, we do not need to elicit a willingness to pay or willing-
ness to accept in monetary terms, but simply ask whether the subject is willing to trade
the endowed good for the other one. As such, mistaken perceptions of market power do
not play a role, nor do income effects. Second, unlike previous market exchange experi-
ments, we create a private environment that limits confounds from social interaction. In
particular, subjects take their decisions anonymously in a private cabin; they find their
endowment placed in front of them when entering the cabin instead of receiving it person-
ally through the hands of the experimenter (which has been criticized for triggering the
misperception of the endowment as a gift (see, e.g., Plott and Zeiler, 2005, 2007)); and
subjects do not interact with other subjects at any stage during the experiment.
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3.3 Sample Details
A sample of 607 students from the University of Bonn participated in the experiment which
was conducted using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) in June and July 2015 at the
BonnEconLab. We conducted 31 sessions with 17 to 20 participants each. Table 1 provides
an overview of the subject pool by treatment conditions.
Table 1: Summary Statistics and Treatment Assignment
Stage 1
Bundle 1 Bundle 2
USB stick Pen set Picnic mat Thermos
A) Initial Endowment 160 152 150 145
– in % of subject pool 26.36% 25.04% 24.71% 23.89%
B) Lost Endowment 80 76 75 72
– in % of A) 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 49.66%
Stage 2
Bundle 1 Bundle 2
USB stick Pen set Picnic mat Thermos
C) Initial Endowment 150 145 160 152
– in % of subject pool 24.71% 23.89% 26.36% 25.04%
D) Baseline Condition 60 58 60 55
– in % of C) 40.00% 40.00% 37.50% 36.18%
E) Probability 0.5 Condition 90 87 100 97
– in % of C) 60.00% 60.00% 62.50% 63.82%
Total number of observations 607
Notes: Stage 2 condition (baseline or probability 0.5 of forced exchange) is randomized
within each session. The use of each bundle as the Stage 1 bundle was counterbalanced
at the session level.
The objects used for the exchange experiment included a USB stick, a set of three erasable
pens, a picnic mat and a thermos.13 We selected these four objects on the basis of a
pre-experimental survey evaluation of 12 candidate goods to ensure that all items were of
approximately equal value to potential participants. We put particular emphasis on ruling
13Pictures and information presented to subjects are reproduced in Appendix C.
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out complementarities between items across rounds. The former two (USB stick and pens)
and the latter two objects (picnic mat and thermos) each constituted a bundle. Every
subject faced exactly one exchange situation with each bundle of objects. The use of each
bundle as Stage 1 bundle was counterbalanced at the session level, with the respective
other bundle used in Stage 2. Within each session, the endowments of one of the two
objects within the bundle was counterbalanced in both stages.14
4 Experimental results
We present the results in three subsections. First, we examine stated good ratings and the
effect of experience in Stage 1, providing our taxonomies of loss averse types and validating
these taxonomies with evidence on the change in mood induced by forced exchange. Second,
we examine behavior in Stage 2, linking heterogeneity in loss aversion to probabilistic
forced exchange. A third subsection is dedicated to the effects of subjective experience on
exchange behavior.
4.1 Stage 1: Loss Aversion, Experience, and Mood
Though no choices were made in Stage 1, we collect two pieces of evidence. First, subjects
provide their ratings for both objects. Second, subjects provide a measure of mood once
before being informed about the randomized confiscation procedure and once after they
learned their random outcome and the exchange was carried out where applicable.
Figure 3 provides histograms of subject’s liking of their endowed and the alternative ob-
ject. Given random assignment of endowed objects and the counterbalanced design, the
distributions of ratings should be identical. Instead, the distribution of ratings for sub-
14That is, if for a given session the USB stick and pens bundle constituted the first stage bundle, the
picnic mat and thermos bundle would be the second stage bundle. Half of the subjects were initially
endowed with the USB stick in the first stage. Among this half of the session participants, again half
would initially receive the picnic mat and the other half the thermos at the beginning of the second stage.
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jects’ own object skews higher than the alternative, yielding a statistically significant stated
preference for the endowed good (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 4.57 (p < 0.01)).
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Figure 3: Preferences and Endowments
Notes; Self-reported scores of liking for the endowed and alternative goods. (Wilcoxon signed-rank statistic
z = 4.57 (p < 0.01), N=607).
Within subject we also find a tendency towards preferring the endowed object relative
to the alternative. Forty-seven percent of subjects report a higher liking score for their
endowed object, twenty-two percent report the same score, and thirty-one percent report
a higher score for the alternate object.15
The liking scores for the endowed and alternative object provide a basis for measuring loss
aversion at the aggregate and individual level. We construct a simple structural model of
15 Our design also collects a score for ‘wanting’ each object. The corresponding percentage shares for
wanting scores are virtually identical (48%, 23%, 29%, respectively). For analysis using these wanting
scores as the basis of analysis see Figure A1, Table A2, and Table A3.
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these ratings based upon standard random utility methods (McFadden, 1974). Consider
an individual endowed with X that is asked to provide ratings statements for both X and
Y prior to being informed of the random confiscation implemented in Stage 1. Through
the lens of the KR model such an individual evaluates X based upon U(X, 0|X, 0). Given
that the agent is endowed with X and is uninformed of the possibility of confiscation at
the time of the ratings, she plausibly evaluates Y based upon U(0, Y |X, 0). With standard
logit shocks, εX and εY , the parameters associated with these utilities are easily estimated.
Unlike choice data, agents may provide the same rating score for both objects. As such, the
estimator must account for identical ratings, something to which standard logit techniques
are also already well adapted (see, e.g Cantillo et al., 2010). We assume agents will provide
a higher rating for their endowed object, X, if
U(X, 0|X, 0) + εX > U(0, Y |X, 0) + εY + δ,
where δ is a discernibility parameter to be estimated. Similarly agents provide a higher
rating for the alternative object, Y , if
U(0, Y |X, 0) + εY > U(X, 0|X, 0) + εX + δ,
and provide the same rating if
|U(X, 0|X, 0) + εX − (U(0, Y |X, 0) + εY )| ≤ δ.
Under the functional form assumptions of η = 1 and mX = X,mY = Y , for someone given
object X, we obtain familiar probabilities for the ranking of ratings R(X) and R(Y ),
P (R(X) > R(Y )) =
exp(U(X, 0|X, 0))
exp(U(X, 0|X, 0)) + exp(U(0, Y |X, 0) + δ)
=
exp(X)
exp(X) + exp(2Y − λX + δ)
P (R(Y ) > R(X)) =
exp(U(0, Y |X, 0))
exp(U(0, Y |X, 0)) + exp(U(X, 0|X, 0) + δ)
=
exp(2Y − λX)
exp(X + δ) + exp(2Y − λX)
P (R(X) = R(Y )) = 1− P (R(X) > R(Y ))− P (R(Y ) > R(X)),
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where the consumption utilities values, X and Y , the discernibility parameter δ, and the
loss aversion parameter, λ, are the desired estimands. For someone endowed with object
Y , these same ratings probabilities are
P (R(X) > R(Y )) =
exp(U(X, 0|0, Y ))
exp(U(X, 0|0, Y )) + exp(U(0, Y |0, Y ) + δ)
=
exp(2X − λY )
exp(Y + δ) + exp(2X − λY )
P (R(Y ) > R(X)) =
exp(u(0, Y |0, Y ))
exp(U(0, Y |0, Y )) + exp(U(X, 0|0, Y ) + δ)
=
exp(Y )
exp(Y ) + exp(2X − λY + δ)
P (R(X) = R(Y )) = 1− P (R(X) > R(Y ))− P (R(Y ) > R(X)).
The likelihood contribution of someone endowed with X or Y follows precisely the for-
mulations above. It will not generally be possible to estimate both utility values, X and
Y , separately. So we normalize one of the goods values to be Y = 1 and estimate the
remaining parameters via maximum likelihood.
Table 2 provides aggregate estimates of consumption utilities, λ and δ, separately for each
bundle of goods. For Bundle 1, we restrict the utility value of USB sticks to be Y = 1
and for Bundle 2 we restrict the utility value of the thermos to be Y = 1. Quite similar
results obtain across the two bundles. For Bundle 1, λ is estimated to be 1.559 (robust s.e
= 0.139), while for Bundle 2 it is estimates to be 1.289 (0.121). For both bundles we reject
the null hypothesis of no loss aversion λ = 1, consistent with the reduced form ratings
results.16 The utility of pen sets and picnic mats are estimated to be lower than those of
USB sticks and Thermoses, respectively. And, discernibility is estimated close to δ = 0.5
in both cases.
The aggregate estimates show evidence of loss aversion. To construct bounds for estimates
of individual loss aversion, we evaluate individual choices assuming average utility and
discernibility values. For example, consider an individual endowed with the pen set in
Bundle 1. At the aggregate estimates of δ and X for Bundle 1, if this individual were
to state a higher ranking for the pen set than for the USB stick, it would imply a loss
16For Bundle 1, the null hypothesis of λ = 1 is rejected, χ2(1) = 16.13, (p < 0.01). For Bundle 2, the
null hypothesis of λ = 1 is also rejected, χ2(1) = 5.73, (p < 0.05).
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Table 2: Aggregate Parameter Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimate (Std. Error) Estimate (Std. Error)
Bundle 1 Bundle 2
Loss Aversion:
λ̂ 1.559 (0.139) 1.289 (0.121)
Utility Values:
X̂1 (Pen Set) 0.632 (0.049)
Ŷ1 (USB Stick) 1 -
X̂2 (Picnic Mat) 0.837 (0.051)
Ŷ2 (Thermos) 1 -
Discernibility:
δ̂ 0.549 (0.061) 0.446 (0.052)
Notes: Maximum likelihood estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
aversion parameter of λ̂ > 3.03.17 Similarly, stating a higher ranking for the USB stick
would imply λ̂ < 1.30,18 and stating the same ranking implies λ̂ ∈ [1.30, 3.03]. Of these
three possible cases, two demonstrate evidence of loss aversion λ̂ > 1, while the other case
is plausibly loss neutral as λ̂ = 1 can rationalize the rankings.19 In total, there exist twelve
cases of endowments and rank orders. Table 3 enumerates the cases and the corresponding
categorization into loss averse, loss neutral, and loss loving types. Overall 217 subjects
(35.7%) are categorized as loss averse, 240 (39.5%) are categorized as loss neutral, and 150
(24.7%) are categorized as loss loving. This is the taxonomy of individual types used in
our analysis.
The inequalities of Table 3 can be aggregated to construct an implied cumulative distribu-
tion function (cdf) for λ. For example, the fact that 42 of 152 (27.6%) subjects endowed
17To state a higher ranking for the pen set implies 0.632 > 2− λ̂ ∗ 0.632 + 0.549 or λ̂ > 3.03.
18 To state a higher ranking for the USB implies 2− λ ∗ 0.632 > 0.632 + 0.549 or λ < 1.30.
19It may seem prima-facie surprising that providing the same ranking in this case is consistent with loss
aversion. The logic is simple: given that the pen set has substantially lower consumption utility than the
USB stick, one must be loss averse to rank them equally.
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Table 3: Individual Classifications
Case #Obs Structural Bounds Taxonomy Reduced Form Taxonomy
Loss Averse Loss Neutral Loss Loving Loss Averse Loss Neutral Loss Loving
Bundle 1
Endowed Pen Set
R(Pen Set) > R(USB Stick) 42 λ̂ > 3.03 X
R(USB Stick) > R(Pen Set) 69 λ̂ < 1.30 X
R(USB Stick) = R(Pen Set) 41 1.30 ≤ λ̂ ≤ 3.03 X
Endowed USB Stick
R(USB Stick) >R(Pen Set) 109 λ̂ > 0.81 X
R(Pen Set) > R(USB Stick) 23 λ̂ < −0.29 X
R(USB Stick) = R(Pen Set) 28 −0.29 ≤ λ̂ ≤ 0.81 X
Bundle 2
Endowed Picnic Mat
R(Picnic Mat) > R(Thermos) 55 λ̂ > 1.92 X
R(Thermos) > R(Picnic Mat) 61 λ̂ < 0.86 X
R(Thermos) = R(Picnic Mat) 34 0.86 ≤ λ̂ ≤ 1.92 X
Endowed Thermos
R(Thermos) > R(Picnic Mat) 79 λ̂ > 1.12 X
R(Picnic Mat) > R(Thermos) 38 λ̂ < 0.23 X
R(Thermos) = R(Picnic Mat) 28 0.23 ≤ λ̂ ≤ 1.12 X
Totals: 607 217 240 150 285 131 191
Notes: Structural bounds taxonomy of types based on individual rankings at estimated aggregate utility values and discernibility parameters from Table 2. Reduced form
taxonomy derived from whether subject exhibits higher, lower, or equal rankings for their endowed good relative to the alternative.
with the pen set prefer the pen set gives an estimate that 72.4% of the population has
λ < 3.03. Similarly, the fact that 69 of 152 subjects with the same endowment prefer
the USB stick gives an estimate that 45.4% of the population has λ < 1.30. In total
there are 8 such inequalities (one for each strict ranking) that carry implications for the
distribution of loss aversion. Figure 4, Panel A aggregates these statements to construct
the implied cdf. The statements are generally internally consistent across conditions, with
only one small non-monotonicity.20 The 50th percentile of loss aversion lies around 1.5, in
line with the aggregate estimates, and around 55% of probability mass lies above λ = 1.
Because we can only summarize a portion of the cdf (around 0.6 of the total), we provide
a quadratic projection based on the 8 data points, indicating a plausible range of loss
aversion below λ = 5. Figure 4, Panel B also provides a histogram of loss aversion based
20Of the 145 subjects endowed with a thermos, 79 prefer the thermos to the picnic mat. This implies
that 1-(79/145) = 45.5% of subjects have λ < 1.12. This generates a slight non-monotonicity relative to
the 69 of 152 subjects endowed with a pen set that prefer the USB stick, which implies that 69/152 =
45.4% of subjects have λ < 1.30. This small inconsistency is most likely due to sampling variation given
the proximity in the loss aversion parameters.
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on the lower bound (upper bound, midpoint) of the range of λ indicated by a subject
rating their endowed good higher than (lower than, equal to) the alternative. Again the
majority of observation (52.7%) lie above λ = 1. Though our analysis focuses on the strict
measurement of loss aversion noted above, we do benchmark the magnitude of our results
to predictions based on these exact values in section 4.2.
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Figure 4: Distribution of Loss Aversion
Notes: Panel A provides implied cumulative distribution function (cdf) for loss aversion based on inequal-
ities in Table 3. Each point represents an in inequality implied by one of 8 strict preference statements.
Quadratic projection based on 8 cdf points. Panel B provides individual measures of loss aversion for each
subject. Measures is based on either the lower bound (upper bound, midpoint) of the range of λ indicated
by a subject’s choice.
Also presented in Table 3 is an alternate taxonomy based only on raw ranking information.
Ignoring utility values and discernibility, this reduced form taxonomy codes someone as
loss averse, neutral, or loving depending only on whether the individual provides a higher,
equal, or lower ranking for their endowed object. Based on this reduced form taxonomy,
285 subjects (47%) are categorized as loss averse, 131 (22%) are classified as loss neutral,
and 191 (31%) are classified as loss loving.21 Though the structural taxonomy provides a
21This follows exactly the relative rankings data noted above.
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more conservative classification of types, there is broad agreement between the structural
and reduced form taxonomies (Pearsons χ2(4) = 315.2, (p < 0.01)). For completeness,
we provide all our analysis with both the structural and reduced form bounds provided in
Table 3.
Table 4: Preference Types and Subjective Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: ∆ Stage 1 Happiness
Full Sample Loss Averse Loss Neutral Loss Loving
Panel A: Structural Bounds Taxonomy
Lost Stage 1 Endowment -0.826*** -2.679*** -0.715** 1.560***
(0.210) (0.385) (0.291) (0.403)
Constant 0.582*** 1.198*** 0.715*** -0.818**
(0.159) (0.254) (0.231) (0.337)
R-Squared 0.0249 0.252 0.0106 0.129
# Observations 607 217 240 150
Panel B: Reduced Form Taxonomy
Lost Stage 1 Endowment -0.826*** -3.169*** -0.443 2.454***
(0.210) (0.282) (0.420) (0.303)
Constant 0.582*** 1.841*** 0.226 -1.264***
(0.159) (0.194) (0.319) (0.256)
R-Squared 0.025 0.308 0.009 0.265
# Observations 607 285 131 191
Notes: Ordinary least squares or two-stage least squares regression. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Panel A: taxonomy of types
based on structural bounds from Table 3. Panel B: taxonomy of types based on reduced form rating
statements from Table 3.
A minimal validation to eschew random response and lend credence to our two classifica-
tions is provided by our mood measures. Table 4 provides a summary of reported mood
regressing the change in Stage 1 Happiness, ∆ Stage 1 Happiness, on the objective expe-
rience of losing one’s object for the full sample and our different identified types. Panel A
presents the results based on the structural taxonomy, while Panel B uses the reduced form
classification of types. For both taxonomies, individuals categorized as loss averse have sub-
stantial deterioration in mood if they lose their endowment, while individuals categorized
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as loss loving grow happier. Individuals categorized as loss neutral experience intermediate
effects, growing somewhat less happy when their endowment is lost. This initial valida-
tion indicates that random response is unlikely to be driving our ratings statements, and
provides evidence supporting our structural classification.
4.2 Stage 2: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Our Stage 2 design relies on between subjects variation. Forty percent of subjects partici-
pate in a baseline standard exchange study, choosing whether to keep their endowed object
or exchange for the alternative. The other sixty percent make the same choice but with
probability 0.5 exchange is forced. Table 5 presents the choices of subjects across these
two conditions with linear probability models for the effect of treatment assignment on an
indicator, Exchange(= 1).22
Before turning to the effects of probabilistic forced exchange, we examine behavior in our
baseline design. Baseline results are conveyed as the estimated constants in least squares
regression of exchange behavior in Table 5. Overall 36.5 percent of subjects choose to
exchange, demonstrating a significant endowment effect relative to the null hypothesis of
fifty percent exchange, F1,605 = 18.32, (p < 0.01). A second validation of our taxonomies
is derived from examining differential baseline behavior across types. Panel A of Table 5
shows that 33 percent of subjects coded as loss averse according to our structural model
choose to exchange, yielding a significant endowment effect relative to 50 percent exchange,
F1,215 = 12.21, (p < 0.01). The fraction of subjects exchanging increases monotonically
from loss averse to loss loving types. 42.9 percent of subjects who are coded as loss
loving choose to exchange, which cannot be differentiated from the 50 percent benchmark,
F1,148 = 1.15, (p = 0.29). Similar conclusions are reached in Panel B of Table 5, based
22The analysis of Table 5 is conducted with robust standard errors. Table A1 repeats this analysis
with standard errors clustered at the session level. The statistical conclusions are unchanged. The results
based on the structural taxonomy of types increase in statistical significance, while the results based on
the reduced for taxonomy decrease in significance when clustering at the session level. Given our focus on
the structural taxonomy, Table 5 represents the more conservative set of conclusions.
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Table 5: Exchange Behavior and Probabilistic Forced Exchange
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Exchange (=1)
Full Sample Loss Averse Loss Neutral Loss Loving
Panel A: Structural Bounds Taxonomy
Forced Exchange 0.004 0.158** 0.0271 -0.248***
(0.040) (0.067) (0.066) (0.078)
Baseline Exchange (Constant) 0.365 0.330 0.361 0.429
(0.032) (0.049) (0.053) (0.067)
R-Squared 0.000 0.025 0.001 0.072
# Observations 607 217 240 150
H0: No Baseline Endowment Effect F1,605=18.32 F1,215=12.21 F1,238=6.85 F1,148=1.15
(p < 0.01) (p < 0.01) (p < 0.01) (p = 0.29)
H0: No Forced Ex. Endowment Effect F1,605=27.48 F1,215=0.07 F1,238=8.14 F1,148 = 63.77
(p < 0.01) (p = 0.78) (p < 0.01) (p < 0.01)
H0: Baseline (col. 2) = Baseline (col. 4) χ2(1) = 1.45
(p = 0.23)
H0: Forced Ex. (col. 2) =Forced Ex(col. 4) χ2(1) = 15.89
(p < 0.01)
Panel B: Reduced Form Taxonomy
Forced Exchange 0.004 0.119** -0.030 -0.149**
(0.040) (0.057) (0.088) (0.074)
Baseline Exchange (Constant) 0.365 0.304 0.392 0.448
(0.032) (0.043) (0.069) (0.061)
R-Squared 0.000 0.015 0.001 0.022
# Observations 607 285 131 191
H0: No Baseline Endowment Effect F1,605=18.32 F1,283=20.65 F1,129=2.45 F1,189=0.73
(p < 0.01) (p < 0.01) (p = 0.12) (p = 0.39)
H0: No Forced Ex. Endowment Effect F1,605=27.48 F1,283=4.04 F1,129=6.45 F1,189 = 23.82
(p < 0.01) (p = 0.045) (p = 0.012) (p < 0.01)
H0: Baseline (col. 2) = Baseline (col. 4) χ2(1) = 3.71
(p = 0.054)
H0: Forced Ex. (col. 2) =Forced Ex(col. 4) χ2(1) = 8.32
(p < 0.01)
Notes: Ordinary least square regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Null hypotheses tested for 1) zero baseline endowment effect, regression (Constant = 0.5); 2)
zero forced exchange endowment effect (Constant + Forced Exchange = 0.5); 3) Identical baseline behavior across loss
averse and loss loving agents (Constant (col. 2) = Constant (col. 4)); 4) Identical treatment effects of forced exchange
across loss averse and loss loving agents (Forced Exchange (col. 2) = Forced Exchange (col. 4)). Hypotheses 3 and 4
tested via seemingly unrelated regression. Panel A: taxonomy of types based on structural bounds from Table 3. Panel
B: taxonomy of types based on reduced form rating statements from Table 3.
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only on the reduced form classification of types. These qualitative differences in Stage 2
baseline exchange behavior are closely in line with theoretical predictions — loss averse
agents are unwilling to exchange, while loss loving types are more eager too — further
validating the Stage 1 taxonomies. It must be noted, however, that though the groups
differentially deviate from the 50 percent benchmark, the difference-in-differences does not
fall within standard measures for statistical significance for either the structural, p = 0.23,
or reduced form, p = 0.05, taxonomies.
Behavior in conditions with probabilistic forced exchange is also reported in Table 5, sep-
arately for the different types of agents. Probabilistic forced exchange yields substantially
different effects across types of loss aversion. Panel A documents that subjects who are
coded as loss averse increase their exchange probability by nearly 16%-age points (∼ 50
percent), under probabilistic forced exchange, F1,215 = 5.64, (p < 0.05). The sizable endow-
ment effect from baseline is eliminated, such that exchange can no longer be differentiated
from the 50 percent benchmark, F1,215 = 0.07, (p = 0.78).
The positive treatment effect for loss averse types is mirrored by a significant negative
treatment effect for loss loving types. Subjects coded as loss loving decrease their exchange
probability by nearly 25%-age points (∼ 60 percent), under probabilistic forced exchange,
F1,148 = 10.18, (p < 0.01).23 The heterogeneous treatment effect over types closely follows
our theoretical development on the sign of comparative statics, and is significant at all
conventional levels, χ2(1) = 15.89, (p < 0.01). Quite similar results are found in Panel
B, basing the analysis only on the reduced form taxonomy. Loss averse agents respond to
forced exchange by exchanging more often while loss loving agents respond by exchanging
less often.
Figure 5 presents more granular analysis of treatment. For each of the twelve structural
types identified in Table 3, we take as a measure of loss aversion the lower bound (upper
bound, midpoint) for those subjects who provided a higher (lower, equal) ranking for their
23 Given these worsened attitudes towards exchange, loss loving agents in the forced exchange condition
deliver a substantial endowment effect relative to the 50 percent benchmark, F1,148 = 63.77, (p < 0.01).
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endowed object relative to the alternative in Stage 1. Figure 5 graphs these values of loss
aversion against each group’s treatment effect noting the classification of type. The size of
each point corresponds to the number of observations. An effectively monotonic pattern
of treatment effects is observed. All four groups coded as loss loving exhibit negative
treatment effects, all four groups coded as loss neutral deliver effectively zero treatment
effect, and all four groups coded as loss averse exhibit positive treatment effects. Even
within loss averse and loss loving groups, subjects coded as more loss averse respond more
positively to forced exchange.
Also graphed in Figure 5 are predicted treatment effects for each group. At the corre-
sponding values of λ and aggregate utility values, we predict the probability of exchange
following closely the logit formulation elaborated in section 4.1.24 Given that these treat-
ment effects will depend on Stage 2 assignment, and the corresponding aggregate utility
values, Figure 5 also provides a locally weighted smoothed prediction. The magnitude
of observed treatment effects are broadly in line with those predicted from the structural
analysis of Stage 1 behavior.
24This formulation maps PE values to choices via the assumption that an agent will exchange based on
the probability that they cannot support not exchanging as a PE. For someone endowed with good X in
the baseline condition, the exchange probability is thus calculated as the probability of choosing Y :
P (Choice = Y )Baseline =
exp ˆ(U(0, Y |X, 0))
exp( ˆU(0, Y |X, 0)) + exp( ˆU(X, 0|X, 0))
=
exp(2Ŷ − λ̂X̂)
exp(X̂) + exp(2Ŷ − λ̂X̂)
,
where X and Y are the aggregate utility values for the goods in question estimate in Table 2 and λ̂ is the
measure of loss aversion taken as the lower bound (upper bound, mid point) of the range of parameters
for the relevant group in Table 3. Similarly, in the forced exchange condition, where not exchanging can
be supported in PE based only on utility values, this is
P (Choice = Y )Forced =
exp(Ŷ )
exp(X̂) + exp(Ŷ )
.
And the predicted treatment effect is calculated as
Prediction = P (Choice = Y )Forced − P (Choice = Y )Baseline.
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Figure 5: Loss Aversion and Treatment Effects
Notes: Stage 1 Loss Aversion corresponds to the lower bound (upper bound) of λ̂ for those who prefer
their own endowment (prefer the other good), and the midpoint for those who rate the goods the same.
Treatment Effect refers to the difference in the probability of exchange between forced exchange and
baseline. Circles represents the treatment effect for each group in the data, with size of circle corresponding
to number of observations. Prediction uses the estimated structural parameters (at the relevant bounds
and midpoints) to calculate the logit probability of exchange.
4.3 Additional Results: Subjective Experience and Exchange
The comparative statics and magnitude of treatment effects match well the theoretical
developments. The taxonomy of loss aversion is respected in the responsiveness of behav-
ior to forced exchange. Nonetheless, Table 5 highlights a marked reticence to exchange
in the forced exchange condition overall . This ‘residual’ endowment effect falls outside
the narrow predictions of the KR model, which, under our assumptions, would predict 50
30
percent exchange in this condition. In Table 6, we explore the effects of experience on
subsequent exchange behavior by linking the variation in experience in Stage 1 to Stage 2
exchanges controlling for interactions between treatment and loss aversion type. Columns
(1) and (4) of Table 6 show that actual experience of having their endowed object confis-
cated and replaced with the alternative in Stage 1 is not statistically related to exchange
behavior in Stage 2. Controlling for the interaction of treatment and type, simply experi-
encing exchange via confiscation and replacement does not engender a greater willingness
to exchange. If anything, the effects are directionally negative, with the experience of
confiscation and replacement in Stage 1 leading to lower trading probabilities in Stage 2.
Table 6: Stage 1 Experience and Stage 2 Exchange Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Exchange (=1)
Lost Stage 1 Endowment -0.049 -0.033 -0.053 -0.038
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
∆ Happiness (Stage 1) 0.020*** 0.019** 0.020*** 0.019**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant 0.453 0.428 0.445 0.475 0.453 0.472
(0.069) (0.067) (0.070) (0.065) (0.061) (0.065)
Treatment X Structural Taxonomy Yes Yes Yes No No No
Treatment X Reduced Form Taxonomy No No No Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.041 0.051 0.052 0.018 0.026 0.027
# Observations 607 607 607 607 607 607
Notes: Ordinary least squares or two-stage least squares regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance
levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
In columns (2) and (5) of Table 6, we examine the correlation between subjective experience
in Stage 1 and exchange behavior in Stage 2. Subjects with more positive subjective Stage
1 experiences are significantly more willing to exchange in Stage 2 controlling for type and
treatment assignment. Columns (3) and (6) ensure that it is the subjective evaluation of
this experience, rather than the objective event of confiscation that leads to changes in
exchange behavior.
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The findings of Table 6 highlight the importance of the subjective perception of experience.
Objectively being forced to exchange seems less critical than the subjective representation
of this experience for fostering future exchange. An understanding of the subjective per-
ception of experience helps to evaluate research on the persistence of exchange anomalies
like the endowment effect (List, 2003, 2004; Engelmann and Hollard, 2010). The view
from this research indicates that the endowment effect is reduced by experiences of ex-
change, and even a minute body of experience (over the course of one experimental session
in Engelmann and Hollard (2010)) can eliminate the phenomena. Our data show that it
is not the objective experience of exchanging one item for another which fosters market
participation, but rather it’s subjective evaluation. Importantly, our results should not
be read as inconsistent with those of Engelmann and Hollard (2010). Their design makes
an explicit connection between exchange and positive experience as subjects must trade
their endowed item in order to keep anything. As such trade is very likely to be viewed as
subjectively positive and so naturally lead to increased trading behavior.25 Beyond such
short-term experiments, our data also help to contextualize longer-term results such as
(List, 2003, 2004), who shows that more experienced traders are less likely to exhibit an
endowment effect. Though exchange should, on average, be a positive experience, it need
not be uniformly so. Our data indicate that negative subjective evaluations of exchange
may slow the speed at which the endowment effect is eliminated by market experience.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Expectations-based reference-dependent preferences (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006) (KR) rep-
resent a key advance in behavioral economics, but a host of conflicting evidence for the
theory exists. In this paper we aimed to reconcile this conflicting evidence by explicitly
recognizing and evaluating heterogeneity in loss aversion. Heterogeneity is critical both
because the model’s comparative statics can change sign depending on the level of loss
25We discuss further differences in the implementation of trading experience between our design and the
previous examination of Engelmann and Hollard (2010) in Appendix B.1.
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aversion, and because prior work has noted that loss aversion is, by no means, a universal
characteristic.
We measure loss aversion by evaluating ranking statements for a first bundle of goods
without choice, and then place subjects in an exchange environment where they make
choices over a second, different bundle of goods. We show that explicitly accounting for the
heterogeneity in loss aversion by and large restores behavior in line with KR predictions.
Individuals that are measured to be loss averse for the first bundle of goods deliver a
substantial endowment effect for the second bundle, validating our taxonomy of types.
Using a mechanism of probabilistic forced exchange, we then show that individuals who
are measured to be loss averse grow more willing to exchange when probabilistically forced
to do so; and individuals who are measured as loss loving grow less willing to exchange.
These findings, and the magnitudes of the observed treatment effects are closely in line
with the predictions of the KR model.
Our results help to reconcile conflicting results in the empirical study of the KR model
(Ericson and Fuster, 2011; Heffetz and List, 2014; Goette et al., 2016) and follow naturally
from the broad recognition of heterogeneity in loss aversion (Sprenger, 2015; Erev et al.,
2008; Harinck et al., 2007; Nicolau, 2012; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009; Knetsch and Wong,
2009; Chapman et al., 2017). If we are to recognize that loss aversion is not a universal
trait, we must also recognize it as a confound of first-order importance for the KR model.
The conclusions drawn from this work rely on ex-ante measurement of the taxonomy of loss
aversion. Though predicted and actual treatment effects generally coincide, our measures
of loss aversion are admittedly broad. Future work could tighten the prediction using
more refined measurements. Of course, more refined measurements come with potential
challenges. If measurement is based on subject choices (e.g., for willingness to pay for
lotteries), these choices themselves must be evaluated as part of a rational expectations
equilibrium plan. Overcoming this joint challenge would represent a helpful advance over
the current work.
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Even accounting for KR forces, our data show a residual endowment effect of subjects being
generally unwilling to exchange. Our results shed light on the mechanisms underlying
such behavior. We show that unwillingness to exchange is related to prior experience,
particularly the subjective perception thereof. Negative experience, regardless of objective
outcome, leads to decreased exchange. This result may helpfully add to the literature on
experience effects and exchange anomalies (List, 2003, 2004; Engelmann and Hollard, 2010),
showing that exchange experience, even short-lived, can reduce the endowment effect. If
the perception of experience influences subsequent exchange, it is possible for exchange
anomalies to persist. Though exchange should generally be viewed as a positive event,
with both parties gaining from trade, negative ex-post perceptions may still engender a
hesitance to trade. Experiments which make explicit connection between trade and positive
experience may thus be overstating the speed at which the endowment effect dissipates.
And, provided that exchange is not a uniformly positive event, exchange anomalies may
indeed persist with experience.
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Appendix: Not for Publication
A Additional Analyses and Robustness Tests
A.1 Robustness Specifications
Below we display regression results with standard errors clustered at the session level.
Tables A1 corresponds to Table 5 in the main text.
1
Table A1: Exchange Behavior and Probabilistic Forced Exchange
Clustered Standard Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Exchange (=1)
Full Sample Loss Averse Loss Neutral Loss Loving
Panel A: Structural Bounds Taxonomy
Probabilistic Forced Exchange 0.004 0.158*** 0.027 -0.248***
(0.034) (0.050) (0.071) (0.060)
Baseline Exchange (Constant) 0.365 0.330 0.361 0.429
(0.028) (0.042) (0.055) (0.049)
R-Squared 0.000 0.025 0.001 0.072
# Observations 607 217 240 150
H0: No Baseline Endowment Effect F1,605=23.85 F1,215=16.44 F1,238=6.30 F1,148=2.13
(p < 0.01) (p < 0.01) (p < 0.05) (p = 0.16)
H0: No Forced Ex. Endowment Effect F1,605=40.85 F1,215=0.19 F1,238=6.23 F1,148 = 83.39
(p < 0.01) (p = 0.67) (p < 0.05) (p < 0.01)
H0: Baseline (col. 2) = Baseline (col. 4) χ2(1) = 1.95
(p = 0.16)
H0: Forced Ex. (col. 2) =Forced Ex(col. 4) χ2(1) = 25.61
(p < 0.01)
Panel B: Reduced Form Taxonomy
Probabilistic Forced Exchange 0.004 0.119** -0.030 -0.149*
(0.034) (0.052) (0.096) (0.087)
Baseline Exchange (Constant) 0.365 0.304 0.392 0.448
(0.028) (0.032) (0.070) (0.076)
R-Squared 0.000 0.015 0.001 0.022
# Observations 607 285 131 191
H0: No Baseline Endowment Effect F1,605=23.85 F1,283=36.46 F1,129=2.39 F1,189=0.47
(p < 0.01) (p < 0.01) (p = 0.13) (p = 0.50)
H0: No Forced Ex. Endowment Effect F1,605=40.85 F1,283=3.46 F1,129=4.25 F1,189 = 22.79
(p < 0.01) (p = 0.073) (p = 0.048) (p < 0.01)
H0: Baseline (col. 2) = Baseline (col. 4) χ2(1) = 2.88
(p = 0.090)
H0: Forced Ex. (col. 2) =Forced Ex(col. 4) χ2(1) = 6.22
(p < 0.05)
Notes: Ordinary least square regression. Standard errors clustered at session level in parentheses. Significance levels:
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Null hypotheses tested for 1) zero baseline endowment effect, regression (Constant
= 0.5); 2) zero forced exchange endowment effect (Constant + Forced Exchange = 0.5); 3) Identical baseline behavior
across loss averse and loss loving agents (Constant (col. 2) = Constant (col. 4)); 4) Identical treatment effects of forced
exchange across loss averse and loss loving agents (Forced Exchange (col. 2) = Forced Exchange (col. 4)). Hypotheses
3 and 4 tested via seemingly unrelated regression. Panel A: taxonomy of types based on structural bounds from Table
3. Panel B: taxonomy of types based on reduced form rating statements from Table 3.
2
All analyses in the main text are based on a taxonomy of preference types based on liking
scores. Below (Figure A1, Table A2, and Table A3) we report corresponding analyses for
a categorization using the wanting scores elicited for the endowed and alternative good in
Stage 1.
0
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Figure A1: Preferences and Endowments. Self-reported scores of wanting for the
endowed and alternative goods. (Wilcoxon signed-rank statistic z = 5.86 (p < 0.01),
N=607).
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Table A2: Aggregate Parameter Estimates
Based on Wanting Scores
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimate (Std. Error) Estimate (Std. Error)
Bundle 1 Bundle 2
Loss Aversion:
λ̂ 1.617 (0.132) 1.346 (0.113)
Utility Values:
X̂1 (Pen Set) 0.674 (0.049)
Ŷ1 (USB Stick) 1 -
X̂2 (Picnic Mat) 0.927 (0.050)
Ŷ2 (Thermos) 1 -
Discernibility:
δ̂ 0.557 (0.060) 0.478 (0.053)
Notes: Maximum likelihood estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A3: Exchange Behavior and Probabilistic Forced Exchange
Type Categorization Based on Wanting Scores
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Exchange (=1)
Full Sample Loss Averse Loss Neutral Loss Loving
Panel A: Structural Bounds Taxonomy
Probabilistic Forced Exchange 0.004 0.129** -0.003 -0.177**
(0.040) (0.065) (0.067) (0.081)
Baseline Exchange (Constant) 0.365 0.327 0.383 0.407
(0.032) (0.048) (0.054) (0.067)
R-Squared 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.035
# Observations 607 223 239 145
H0: No Baseline Endowment Effect F1,605=18.32 F1,221=13.29 F1,237=4.68 F1,143=1.89
(p < 0.01) (p < 0.01) (p < 0.05) (p = 0.17)
H0: No Forced Ex. Endowment Effect F1,605=27.48 F1,221=0.97 F1,237=9.62 F1,143 = 36.65
(p < 0.01) (p = 0.33) (p < 0.01) (p < 0.01)
H0: Baseline (col. 2) = Baseline (col. 4) χ2(1) = 0.97
(p = 0.32)
H0: Forced Ex. (col. 2) =Forced Ex(col. 4) χ2(1) = 8.78
(p < 0.01)
Panel B: Reduced Form Taxonomy
Probabilistic Forced Exchange 0.004 0.103* -0.093 -0.092
(0.040) (0.056) (0.085) (0.079)
Baseline Exchange (Constant) 0.365 0.297 0.439 0.431
(0.032) (0.042) (0.066) (0.065)
R-Squared 0.000 0.011 0.009 0.008
# Observations 607 293 138 176
H0: No Baseline Endowment Effect F1,605=18.32 F1,291=23.24 F1,136=0.86 F1,187=1.11
(p < 0.01) (p < 0.01) (p = 0.36) (p = 0.29)
H0: No Forced Ex. Endowment Effect F1,605=27.48 F1,291=7.24 F1,136=8.40 F1,187 = 13.50
(p < 0.01) (p < 0.01) (p < 0.01) (p < 0.01)
H0: Baseline (col. 2) = Baseline (col. 4) χ2(1) = 3.01
(p = 0.08)
H0: Forced Ex. (col. 2) =Forced Ex(col. 4) χ2(1) = 4.12
(p < 0.05)
Notes: Ordinary least square regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Null hypotheses tested for 1) zero baseline endowment effect, regression (Constant = 0.5); 2)
zero forced exchange endowment effect (Constant + Forced Exchange = 0.5); 3) Identical baseline behavior across loss
averse and loss loving agents (Constant (col. 2) = Constant (col. 4)); 4) Identical treatment effects of forced exchange
across loss averse and loss loving agents (Forced Exchange (col. 2) = Forced Exchange (col. 4)). Hypotheses 3 and 4
tested via seemingly unrelated regression. Panel A: taxonomy of types based on structural bounds from wanting scores.
Panel B: taxonomy of types based on reduced form rating statements from wanting scores.
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B Comments on Related Literature
B.1 Engelmann and Hollard (2010)
In the laboratory study of Engelmann and Hollard (2010), subjects play three trading
rounds prior to a final trading situation with the experimenter. They show that the en-
dowment effect in the final (voluntary) exchange vanishes for those who have been forced
to trade their endowed good in the training rounds, but persists for those who were allowed
to voluntarily exchange during the training round. The implementation of forced trading
in Engelmann and Hollard (2010) differs from ours in important ways. In the training
rounds, subjects in the treatment group are forced to exchange in the sense that otherwise,
they lose their endowed good and do not receive anything in return. If endowed with good
X, subjects choose between a situation of exchanging X for good Y, and losing X without
receiving Y either. This way, the training rounds, in a broad sense, ‘condition’ subjects
to perceive exchange favorably by exposing them to the threat of leaving empty-handed.
One explanation that reconciles their findings with our observation that the subjective
perception of experience, i.e. its valence, determines subsequent willingness to trade, is
that subjects who were forced to trade three times in a row in Engelmann and Hollard
(2010) precisely grew more willing to trade because they learned to associate the no trade
choice with not getting anything. Our notion of exchange – be it forced or voluntary – is
motivated by typical trading situations and involves giving up the endowment in return
for something else, instead of sacrificing the endowment for nothing in return. In any case,
participants in the trade-it-or-lose-it design of Engelmann and Hollard (2010) were indeed
more likely to make a subjectively positive experience than in our setting.26
Conceptually, Engelmann and Hollard (2010) attribute exchange asymmetries to ‘trade
uncertainty’ about market procedures, specifically that individuals misperceive and exag-
gerate the costs or risks of market transactions absent experience. Even in the simple,
26A more critical interpretation is that training people to trade under the threat of losing leaving
empty-handed otherwise is susceptible to experimenter demand effects because subjects could infer that
the experimenter wants them to trade in the subsequent exchange situation.
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stylized and short-lived experimental exchange setting, they suggest, people grow accus-
tomed to trading in that the perceived risks or costs of trading decrease significantly.27
While the notion of trade uncertainty is recognizably broad and potentially incorporates
our valence finding, our experimental design attempts to eliminate potential sources of
uncertainty about the trading mechanism by giving it a precise, transparent and simple
structure, as well as by limiting social interaction.
27The training and second stages of Engelmann and Hollard (2010) still differ in important dimensions,
however: The training rounds take place in a setting “without any restriction” where subjects can “interact,
bargain, move, and so on” (Engelmann and Hollard, 2010, p.2008), while the final round is set in an
isolated room facing the experimenter alone. The general setup is subject to a methodological criticism
of laboratory exchange situations (Plott and Zeiler, 2005, 2007), because exchange is implemented as a
direct social interaction that triggers, e.g., social comparison processes.
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C Instructions and Material Presented to Participants
All instructions and information presented to participants have been translated from Ger-
man to English.
C.1 Images of Objects Presented to Participants
The following images were projected to the wall of the lecture room at the beginning of
the respective stage. For the displayed example, the Stage 1 bundle consisted of the USB
stick and erasable pens, but this was counter-balanced at the session level.
Part 1
USB stick
• 8GB, USB 2.0, from brand Kingston
• Slim metallic case, eye for key ring
Erasable pens
• Erasable rollerball, from brand Pilot
• 3 pieces: black, blue, red
Figure A2: Image 1 Projected on the Wall to Present Objects. For Stage 1 with
goods bundle consisting of USB stick and erasable pens.
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Part 2
Thermos bottle
• Stainless steel, 500ml, double-wall insulated
• For warm and and cold drinks
Picnic mat
• Foldable, water-resistant PVC bottom side
• Ca. 120x140cm, with Velcro fastener
Figure A3: Image 2 Projected on the Wall to Present Objects. For Stage 2 with
goods bundle consisting of thermos and picnic mat.
C.2 Instructions (computer-based)
Welcome to part 1 of 2 in this experiment!
Please close the curtain of you cabin and read the following information. All computer
entries that you make in this experiment are fully anonymous and cannot be traced back to
you. Speed is not important at any point in this experiment. Please always take sufficient
time to read and understand the instructions.
The [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ] now belongs to you. You can
touch and inspect it at any time. However, please do not yet open the packaging and
do not use the object yet. The two objects presented to you ( [ USB stick and erasable
pens / thermos and picnic mat ] ) have been randomly allocated to the cabins in equal
9
quantities. Your cabin number was also randomly determined based on your choice of seat
in the presentation room.
Please click on OK when you have read these information. If you have questions, please
call an experimenter.
Please answer the questions.
[ USB stick / thermos ]
How much do you like this product?
How much would you want to have this product?
[ Erasable pens / picnic mat ]
How much do you like this product?
How much would you want to have this product?
Please read the following information carefully.
The experimenter will soon draw a random number between 1 and 20 using a lotto drum.
The drawn number will then be announced loudly. If the drawn number is a number [ from
11 to 20 / from 1 to 10 ], your [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ] will
be taken away from you and you instead receive [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos /
picnic mat ]. If the drawn number is a number [ from 1 to 10 / from 11 to 20 ], you will
keep your [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ] and nothing happens. After
the number has been drawn and the exchange of objects has taken place (if applicable),
nothing else happens in this part of the experiment. You can then keep your object for
good.
Please only confirm below once you have understood everything. If you have questions,
please call the experimenter and wait until he comes to your cabin.
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[ Mood elicitation 1 ]
Please answer the following questions about how you currently feel. Which expressions
better apply to you at the moment?
“Unhappy, Angry, Unsatisfied, Sad, Desperate” – “Happy, Thrilled, Satisfied, Content,
Hopeful”
The time has come. Please wait until the number has been drawn.
Remember: If the drawn number is a number [ from 11 to 20 / from 1 to 10 ], your [ USB
stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ] will be taken away from you and you instead
receive [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ]. If the drawn number is a
number [ from 1 to 10 / from 11 to 20 ], you will keep your [ USB stick / erasable pens /
thermos / picnic mat ].
The drawn number is [ 1 / 2 / ... / 20 ].
This number is a number [ from 1 to 10 / from 11 to 20 ]. Therefore [ you can keep your
[ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ] / your [ USB stick / erasable pens /
thermos / picnic mat ] will be taken away from you and you instead receive [ USB stick /
erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ] ]. Please wait while the experimenter carries out
the exchange in all cabins.
[ Mood elicitation 2 and control question. ]
Please answer the following questions about how you currently feel. Which expressions
better apply to you at the moment?
“Unhappy, Angry, Unsatisfied, Sad, Desperate” – “Happy, Thrilled, Satisfied, Content,
Hopeful”
Regarding the lottery draw, that has just taken place: What was the probability (in per-
11
cent) that you would lose your initial object? Please enter a number between 0 and 100.
Part 1 of the experiment is over!
Please follow the instructions.
• Memorize your cabin number.
• You can no go back to the presentation room.
• Please leave your [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ] in the cabin.
You will be back in the same cabin in a few minutes.
• Remember: The object now belongs to you for good and you will take it away from
this experiment.
Welcome to part 2 in this experiment!
Please close the curtain of you cabin and read the following information. The [ USB stick
/ erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ] now also belongs to you. You can touch and
inspect it at any time. However, please do not yet open the packaging and do not use the
object yet. The two objects presented to you for part 2 ( [ USB stick and erasable pens
/ thermos and picnic mat ] ) have again been randomly allocated to the cabins in equal
quantities.
Please click on OK when you have read these information. If you have questions, please
call an experimenter.
[ Instructions Stage 2 – ONLY BASELINE (p=0.0) ]
Please read the following information carefully. The [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos
/ picnic mat ] from part 2 of the experiment now belongs to you and you can keep it for
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good. If you like, you can exchange your [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic
mat ] voluntarily for [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ]. Whichever way
you decide, your choice is final and you will take your selected object with you from this
experiment.
Please only confirm below once you have understood everything. If you have questions,
please call the experimenter and wait until he comes to your cabin.
[ Instructions Stage 2 – ONLY FORCED EXCHANGE (p=0.5) ]
Please read the following information carefully. You have received a new object in part 2
of the experiment ( [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ] ). You will soon
get the opportunity to exchange your [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat
] voluntarily for [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ].
If you decide to exchange, you will receive [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic
mat ] as requested for your [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ] and you
can then keep your [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ] for good. The
experiment is then finished.
If you decide against an exchange, there will be a probability of 50% that the exchange
will be forced anyways and you have to exchange nevertheless.
Concretely, the following happens in the case that you decide against a voluntary exchange:
The experimenter will draw a random number between 1 and 20 using a lotto drum (as in
part 1 of the experiment). The drawn number will then be announced loudly. If the drawn
number is a number [ from 11 to 20 / from 1 to 10 ], your [ USB stick / erasable pens /
thermos / picnic mat ] will be taken away from you and you instead receive [ USB stick /
erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ]. If the drawn number is a number [ from 1 to 10 /
from 11 to 20 ], you will keep your [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ]
and nothing happens. After the number has been drawn and the exchange of objects has
taken place (if applicable), nothing else happens in this part of the experiment. You can
then keep your object for good.
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Please only confirm below once you have understood everything. If you have questions,
please call the experimenter and wait until he comes to your cabin.
[ Mood elicitation 3 ]
Before you get the opportunity to exchange your object, please answer the following ques-
tions about how you currently feel. Which expressions better apply to you at the moment?
“Unhappy, Angry, Unsatisfied, Sad, Desperate” – “Happy, Thrilled, Satisfied, Content,
Hopeful”
Do you want to exchange your [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic
mat ] for a [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ]?
Yes, I want to exchange.
No, I do not want to exchange.
[ ONLY BASELINE (p=0.0) ]
You have decided [ for / against ] a voluntary exchange. Please wait while the experimenter
carries out the exchange in all cabins.
[ ONLY FORCED EXCHANGE (p=0.5) ]
You have decided [ for / against ] a voluntary exchange. Please wait while the experimenter
carries out the exchange in all cabins.
[ ONLY NON-TRADERS ] After this, it will be determined whether you have to exchange
anyways.
[ ONLY TRADERS ] Please wait until the experiment continues. A random number will
now be drawn for those who decided against a voluntary exchange. After that the experi-
ment continues for you.
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[ ONLY NON-TRADERS ] Remember: If the drawn number is a number [ from 11 to 20
/ from 1 to 10 ], your [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ] will be taken
away from you and you instead receive [ USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat
]. If the drawn number is a number [ from 1 to 10 / from 11 to 20 ], you will keep your [
USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ].
[ ONLY NON-TRADERS ]
The drawn number is [ 1 / 2 / ... / 20 ]
This number is a number [ from 1 to 10 / from 11 to 20 ]. Therefore [ you can keep you [
USB stick / erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ] / your [ USB stick / erasable pens /
thermos / picnic mat ] will be taken away from you and you instead receive [ USB stick /
erasable pens / thermos / picnic mat ]. Please wait while the experimenter carries out the
exchange in all cabins.
[ Mood elicitation 4 ]
Please answer the following questions about how you currently feel. Which expressions
better apply to you at the moment?
“Unhappy, Angry, Unsatisfied, Sad, Desperate” – “Happy, Thrilled, Satisfied, Content,
Hopeful”
The experiment is over!
You can keep both your objects. You will also receive a show-up fee of 4 euros. Please wait
shortly in you cabin until the experimenter calls you out. Thank you for your participation!
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